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ABSTRACT: In “Image, Evidence, Argument,” Ian Dove defends an intriguing ‘middle ground’ between 
those who argue that there are “visual arguments” (notably Groarke) and skeptics who argue that 
there are not (notably Johnson). I discuss one of Dove’s key examples, proposing a different analysis 
of it, arguing that there are problems with the “verbal repackaging” of the argument he suggests. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In an important article on visual argument Dove (2012) has proposed a position on 
visual arguments that is situated somewhere in between defences of the claim that 
there are visual arguments (offered by commentators like Groarke, 1996 and Blair, 
1996), and the scepticism espoused by others (like Fleming, 1996 and Johnson, 
2005). In the end, Dove declares that he is uncertain whether there are visual 
arguments but argues strongly in favor of the claim that “visual evidence” has a role 
to play in many arguments. In particular, Dove maintains that “photographic images 
can fill an evidentiary role in which the image acts as a verifier, corroborator or 
refuter of some claim within an argument” (Dove, 2012, p. 379). 
 In the process of developing his views, Dove highlights some key issues that 
arise in the study of visual arguments. In a number of important ways, I think his 
discussion is illuminating, but I will take issue with his general approach to the 
issues he discusses. It proceeds by analysing prima facie visual arguments in a way 
that separates their verbal and visual components, rendering their core 
argumentative components as verbal at the same time that it assigns an important, 
but fundamentally different role to their visual components. I shall describe this 
approach as an attempt to “verbally repackage” visual arguments because it 
reorganizes what seem to be obvious visual arguments in a way that allows one to 
move their argumentative aspects to the verbal realm. This approach may make 
such arguments more acceptable to those who reject the idea that there are visual 
arguments but I shall argue that it misrepresents the examples Dove discusses. In 
doing so, I will focus on his analysis of an important legal case in California in which 
the use of visual evidence is the central issue in the trial. 
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2. ON VISUAL EVIDENCE 
 
In my discussion I take a “visual argument” to be any argument which includes 
components (premises, conclusions, evidence, etc.) which are visual rather than 
verbal. Most visual arguments mix verbal and visual cues. They are in this sense 
“multi-modal” and are visual and verbal at one and the same time. In this discussion 
my interest is Dove’s attempt to minimize the role that visual elements play within 
arguments. It is in this regard significant that he does not reject their role entirely. 
He recognizes that there are times when an appeal to visual evidence of some sort is 
a key component of the attempt to establish the truth of some conclusion. One 
important contribution he makes to the discussion of visual arguments is some key 
examples that he uses to demonstrate this point. 
 Dove’s examples do not lead him to the conclusion that there are visual 
arguments – at least so long as we understand “visual arguments” as arguments 
which have visual premises. He tries to account for the role of the visual in cases 
where this appears to be the case in a different way, by conceding the importance of 
the visual, but by assigning it a role different from the role of premise. One might 
describe this strategy by saying that Dove ascribes the visual a role in 
argumentation but not within argument itself. 
 Dove’s account begins with an analysis of the role of diagrams in 
mathematical reasoning. This convinces him that visual evidence can “verify” a 
mathematical conclusion, even though it does not have a role in the reasoning that 
leads to it. As he puts it: this “account of visual evidence as verifier etc., when 
applied to the case of diagrams in mathematics, solves a long-standing problem for 
mathematical practice. Namely, if diagrams aren’t a legitimate component of 
mathematical reasoning, why are so many mathematical texts littered with them? 
The answer, of course, is that they are a legitimate part of the reasoning. Their role, 
however, isn’t one of premise, but of evidence.” (Dove, 2012, p. 388) 
 This distinction between premise and argument on the one hand, and verifier 
and evidence on the other, seems to me to highlight some central issues in the 
discussion of visual argument. In the current context the important point is that it 
allows Dove to give images a role in argument (as “evidence” and/or “verifier”) 
without making them a component of arguments themselves. While I have some 
doubts about Dove’s analysis of the role of images in mathematical reasoning (for a 
contrasting view see Barwise & Ethcmendy, 1996), my concern in this paper is his 
attempt to apply it to visual arguments more broadly. To this end, I want to consider 
his discussion of a 1948 California trial he describes as “an odd legal case.” 
 In The People v. Doggett, a married couple (the Doggetts) were convicted of a 
crime of “oral sexual perversion.” For reasons I will outline, I think that this is a 
landmark case from the point of view of visual argument. It was one of the first 
times that photographic evidence played a key role in the trial. In a situation in 
which there were no eye witnesses to the acts in question, the Doggetts were 
ultimately convicted on the basis of photographs they had taken of the sexual act in 
question. In view of this, the decision at the trial turned on a paradigm-breaking 
question: whether photographic evidence could be used to establish the guilt of the 
accused. 
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 On the face of it, the Doggett trial seems to be a very a clear case of visual 
argument.  The photographs presented by the prosecution performed the role of 
premises that lead to the conclusion that the couple committed the illegal act the 
prosecution charged them with. While Dove is willing to grant that the visual 
evidence played a key role in the decision, he reconstructs the argument at the trial 
as the following verbal argument: 
 
(1) If the Doggetts engaged in the illicit act, then they should be convicted. 
(2) The Doggetts engaged in the illicit act. So,  
(3) The Doggetts should be convicted. 
 
In proposing this analysis of the argument at the trial, Dove undertakes what I have 
described as verbal repackaging, taking a prima facie visual argument and turning it 
into a verbal argument, which eliminates the role that visual images seem to 
obviously play within it. As Dove himself points out, “the logic of the case” is, when 
the argument is construed in the way that he suggests, a simple modus ponens 
which leaves “no room for the photo” in the logic of the argument. 
 Dove does have an answer to the obvious response that his account of the 
argument at the Doggett trial fails to acknowledge the role of visual evidence in the 
Doggett case. For he does not deny its significance and tries to account for it by 
granting the photographic evidence an important role outside the argument as he 
portrays it. He explains his account by writing that: “One doesn't infer the truth of 
the claim [that they engaged in a crime of sexual perversion] from the photo, one 
perceives it…. I distinguish the process of inferring, in which a claim garners support 
conditionally upon the acceptance of some other claims, from the process of 
perception, whereby one apprehends the truth or falsity of a claim…” (Dove, 2012, p. 
384). Here we have another version of Dove’s earlier distinctions between premise 
and evidence, between argument and verifier. An argument is, on his account, a way 
to infer the truth of a view; a verifier is, in contrast, something that allows us to 
perceive it as true. In the Doggett case, “The photo doesn't support the claim 
logically, as logical support is about the flow of truth values … from a reason or set 
of reasons to a conclusion. Instead, the photo merely verifies truth without offering 
logical support.” (Dove, 2012, p. 384) 
 I shall argue that this way of understanding the argument in the Doggett case 
is in a number of ways mistaken. But first I want to say that it may have some initial 
plausibility if we compare its way of dealing with visual evidence to normal cases of 
seeing. For these are cases in which it would seem wrong to always say that one 
infers what one sees from the act of seeing. If we are at the market and I look at 
someone on the midway and declare “There’s Fedalya” we would not normally say 
that this claim is the conclusion of an argument which I infer from my act of seeing. 
Outside of philosophical arguments about the external world and the veracity of 
perception, I don’t infer that Fedalya is there, I simply see her. Using Dove’s 
terminology, we would say that what I see provides me not with premises, but with 
evidence that allows me to perceive or verify that Fedalya is there. Such seeing is not, 
one might conclude, an instance of argument, though it may verify the premises that 
are elaborated within an argument, as when I reason that “Fedalya’s there, so she 
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isn’t attending her anatomy class today.” By dealing with all instances of visual 
evidence in this way, Dove attempts to explain their role in argument without 
granting them a role as premises in an argument. 
  
3. UNDERSTANDING DOGGETT 
 
Granting that the Doggett case is a test case for an account of visual argument, there 
are a number of problems with Dove’s reconstruction of the reasoning at the trial. In 
principle, one can summarize the prosecution’s argument at any criminal trial in the 
way that Dove does; as an instance of the following modus ponens. 
 
(1) If the accused engaged in the illicit act, then they should be convicted. 
(2) They engaged in the illicit act. So,  
(3) They should be convicted. 
 
Though this paraphrase isn’t incorrect, it is not a helpful summary of the reasoning 
at a trial. As we can see in the Doggett case, it gives us little insight into the 
arguments that take place at the trial. It is especially notable that it fails to highlight 
the specific issues of debate that the prosecution and defence address in making 
their arguments for and against the charges that the judge or jury must consider. 
 In the Doggett case, Dove’s version of the argument at the trial leaves out the 
key issues that are contested by the prosecution and defence. Much more 
fundamentally, it misdirects us, pointing us away from, rather than toward the 
issues that need to be addressed. In part it does so because it leaves out the visual 
evidence which is the crux of the trial. In ordinary cases of seeing, one might say that 
one perceives what one sees rather than inferring it, but it is a mistake to jump to 
Dove’s assumption that acts of seeing need to be understood as instances of 
perceiving rather than inference. The Doggett case is of interest in the study of 
visual argument precisely because it is a paradigm example which shows that this is 
not the case. We fundamentally misconstrue the trial if we think that a juror shown 
the photographs at the trial can simply look at them and perceive that it is true that 
the Doggetts committed the acts in question. The whole reason there is a trial is 
because it is, at the outset of the proceedings (and in the Appeal Court), an open 
question whether they provide convincing evidence that this is so. 
 Reading Dove’s summary of the case, one would not know that the 
arguments at trial focused very pointedly on the photographs and the question of 
whether they were credible evidence that showed the Doggetts were guilty. This 
was not something that could simply be perceived. It was, rather, something that 
had to be established and inferred from a great deal of subsidiary argument. It was 
the photographs plus these arguments – not a simple viewing of the photographs – 
that allowed the jury to verify the claim that the Doggetts were guilty as charged. 
The best verbal summary of the prosecution’s argument at the trial is not, therefore, 
the one that Dove provides, but the claim that the Doggetts are guilty of sexual 
perversion because the photographs in question showed them to be so. This is a 
better summary precisely because it highlights the role of the photographs in the 
argument in a situation in which it is their credibility which is the main issue that 
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must be discussed. The best verbal summary of the trial is, therefore, one that 
pointedly directs us to the visual evidence as its principal component. 
 In the trial, this makes the locus of the dispute between the prosecution and 
the defence the question whether the photographs were reliable. The defendants’ 
position is recorded in the Appeal Court decision, which notes that “by these 
defendants it is earnestly contended that these photographs were not sufficiently 
verified or authenticated to make them admissible into evidence, and that without 
them the corpus delicti was not established and there is no evidence in the record 
showing that this offense was committed.” In making the contrary case, the 
prosecution went to elaborate lengths to prove the photographs were authentic and 
not “faked.” Among other things, it photographed the contents of the Doggetts’ 
apartment to show that furniture in the photographs was theirs; proved that the 
camera that took the photographs belonged to Mr. Doggett; established that the 
photographs were developed in a darkroom they had put together in their 
apartment; and had witnesses testify that the people in the photographs were the 
Doggetts. 
 When the Doggetts original conviction was appealed, the arguments at the 
Court of Appeal focused on the question whether visual, photographic evidence, 
could be a basis for the conclusion that they were guilty. In this way, what was on 
trial in the appeal of the Doggett case was the use of visual arguments in California 
courts, and the circumstances in which photographs could be permitted to decide 
the question whether someone should be convicted of a crime. The case broke new 
ground in California jurisprudence because it was the first time the California courts 
permitted photographic evidence in a situation in which the person who took the 
photographs refused to testify to the fact that they were genuine. This significantly 
broadened the grounds under which photographic evidence could be accepted by 
the court. 
 As Judge Barnard wrote in his decision (California Court of Appeals, 1948): 
 
The general rule is that photographs are admissible when it is shown that they are 
correct reproductions of what they purport to show. This is usually shown by the 
testimony of the one who took the picture. However, this is not necessary and it is 
well settled that the showing may be made by the testimony of anyone who knows 
that the picture correctly depicts what it purports to represent…. 
It was rather conclusively shown that these were actual and genuine 
photographs, taken by one of the defendants themselves. There was nothing to 
justify a contrary inference and no other possible explanation either appears or was 
attempted. Under these particular circumstances it must be held that a sufficient 
showing was made in this regard and that these photographs were properly 
admitted into evidence. 
 
The lesson is that one cannot, in a case like this, simply look at photographs and 
“perceive” or “verify” that what they appear to depict is in fact the case. 
 It is in this regard significant that we can easily imagine a situation in which a 
trial like the Doggett trial proceeded differently. If the defence had pointed out that 
the man in the photographs had a tattoo on his left hand, that Mr. Doggett did not, 
and that there was another man in the same building who looked like him and had 
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the tattoo, then this would be strong evidence that the photographs had been faked 
and were not admissible as evidence. This and many other possibilities are open at 
the beginning of the trial. The only way to resolve them is by invoking the visual 
elements of the argument. In part this reflects the fact that one strand of the history 
of photography is a history of doctored photographs. Their possibility prevents one 
from simply looking at the photographs in the Doggett trial and perceiving that the 
Doggetts were guilty of the acts in question. This makes the case a situation in which 
visual evidence is part of an argument which requires that the jurors infer – not 
simply perceive – that the Doggetts did what the photographs depict.    
 Once we recognize that the Doggett case presents us with a situation in 
which visual evidence is the basis for the court’s inference that the Doggetts were 
guilty, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that a good summary of the argument at 
trial should identify the verbal and the visual components it contains. One way to do 
so is by diagramming the argument in a way that recognizes all these elements. The 
following diagram can serve this purpose: 
 
 
Figure 1: The Argument Against the Doggetts 
 
Understanding the diagram’s components as follows: 
 
EVIDENCE-[1]: Verbal and visual evidence used to establish that the 
photographs presented to prove the crime had been committed are 
authentic and reliable (“true”). 
CONCLUSION-[1]: The photographs presented to prove the crime had 
been committed are acceptable as evidence. 
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EVIDENCE-[2]: The content of the photographs, which appears to 
depict the Doggetts engaged in the illegal act. 
EVIDENCE-[3]: The evidence that the act is illegal under the California 
criminal code. 
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSION-[2]: The conclusion that the Doggetts are 
guilty.  
 
Within this diagram I have left open the question whether the visual evidence 
portrayed in this diagram is best described as “visual premises.”  I leave that for 
another. What matters here is that this evidence is the basis of the inference that 
convicts the Doggetts of sexual perversion. While my diagram does not attempt to 
capture all the nuances of the prosecution’s arguments at the trial and the appeal, I 
propose it as a much better outline of the structure of the argument than the 
summary that Dove has suggested. 
 
4. CONCLUSION: A NOTE ON VERBAL REPACKAGING 
 
In this paper I have argued that Dove’s attempt to verbally repackage the visual 
arguments at the Doggett trial is unsuccessful. In light of this conclusion, I want to 
end my discussion with some general comments about verbal repackaging, in part 
because the same approach to visual arguments plays a role in Johnson’s critique of 
visual argument. Johnson seems to have it in mind when he writes (Johnson, 2005) 
that “For every visual argument, there will exist a verbal counterpart of that 
argument; but not vice-versa [his italics]” and “Visual argument depends on verbal 
argument” but “there is no evidence of a dependence the other way [his italics]… The 
practice of argumentation as we have it today has developed largely out of verbal 
argument: whether spoken or written. The apparatus that surrounds it (the notions 
of premise, conclusion, enthymeme, missing premise, internal argument objection, 
criticism) all are verbal in character.” 
 Though I disagree with Johnson’s views, this is not because I reject the verbal 
repackaging of visual arguments. Such repackaging plays an essential role in their 
discussion. Sometimes it is helpful just because it is not feasible to reproduce the 
visual components that visual arguments contain. In other situations, verbal 
repackaging can promote the discussion of visual components and isolate aspects of 
them that warrant discussion and debate. This is something that I grant. My 
arguments in this paper should not, therefore, be taken as a rejection of verbal 
repackaging. What I reject is the suggestion that verbal repackaging somehow 
shows that there are no visual arguments or that the business of reasoning and 
arguing is ultimately verbal and can be contained within a verbal paradigm.  
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